Abstract. This paper discusses implementation conditions based on the Bayesian equilibrium, in which different parameter spaces are affected by controlled variables chosen by mechanism designers and a theoretical foundation to discuss the change in design for parameter spaces under the bi-variable scenario is provided. Then we provide sufficient and necessary conditions of mechanism duality when the goal function remains unchanged which is applied in state-owned land auction mechanisms in China. The results show that when players strategically choose their action, the mechanisms of limited housing price auction and of limited land price auction are dual equivalent while the government's revenue is maximized. The key difference between the efficiency of the market mechanism and that of the non-market mechanism lies in the tradeoff between the government's interests and consumers' benefits.
Introduction
The objective of a mechanism designer is to optimize the social welfare function based on environment parameter spaces; however, relevant information about environment parameters is scattered in the economy. Hurwicz (1972) [1] formally defined the issue of information in scattered systems under the mechanism design framework. The supply of false information relies on the transformation of information to the expected function of social decisions by designers.
Mechanism is usually discussed under the framework or realization and implementation. The essential difference between these two frameworks is that the latter uses strategic interactions. Maskin (1977) [2] was the first to propose monotonicity, which proved that the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium to be implemented is monotonicity when more than three players exist. Implementation problems are mainly studied from two perspectives, namely, incentive compatibility and multiplicity of equilibrium. Vikrey (1961) [3] was the first to invent the application of Bayesian equilibrium in a mechanism implementation related work about auction. Schmeidler (1980) [4] discussed multiple equilibriums issues of the Bayesian equilibrium, while Postlewaite (1989) [5] discussed the existence and efficiency of multiple equilibriums in bilateral auctions. Moreover, Linhart and Radner (1989) [6] studied the continuity of multiple equilibriums. Palfrey and Srivastava (1989a [7] ; 1989b [8] ) studied non-dominated Bayesian equilibrium and pointed out that no player uses the weak strategy of Bayesian equilibrium, which implies the dominance and the best responses of Bayesian equilibrium. Furthermore, Moore and Repullo (1988) [9] and Abreu and Sen (1989) [10] discussed the extension of solution concepts to sequential equilibrium under the condition of complete information, thus expanding the implementable social functions set, although the degree of such an extension is smaller than that of the excluded weakly dominated strategies. Abreu and Matsushima (1990a [11] ; 1990b [12] ) examined implementation issues in the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Fudenberg (2010) [13] discussed the robustness in the implementation of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium concept in the presence of disturbances. The parameter spaces mentioned in previous literature are exogenously given and not affected by mechanism designers. However, mechanism designers can always either affect or alter exogenous parameter spaces through mechanism design.
State-owned land auction in China adopted the first-price sealed-bid land auction (FSLA) mechanism prior to 2008, and new mechanisms have emerged ever since. Policy No. 63 issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources on May 13, 2011 clearly stipulates the use of listing or bidding for auction state-owned land while limiting housing price or land price. Thus, such a possibility of improvement was proposed with regard to the auction mechanism design. Some scholars have conducted research about the land market in China. Cao (2008) [14] discussed the role of local governments' land finance in the urbanization process. The results showed that the fundamental cause of land market distortions in China is that the government can obtain land at a relatively low cost. Chau (2010) [15] discovered that state-owned land auction generates new information for the real estate market and that the unexpected outcomes of land auction have asymmetric effects on the real estate market. Cai (2009) [16] discussed the bribery phenomenon in the land auction in China. The study showed that counterfeits and competitions in two-staged auctions are less significant than those in English auctions.
This paper studies how mechanism designers alter parameter spaces through different variable choices based on the Bayesian equilibrium concept. We first prove the equivalent conditions of mechanisms and provide a theoretical foundation to discuss the change in design for parameter spaces under the bi-variable scenario.We then discuss the efficiency comparison among three mechanisms used in the state-owned land auction in China through application and solve two problems. The first problem is whether or not non-market mechanism (limiting housing price or land price) is more efficient than market mechanism while maximizing government's interests. The second problem is the conditions under which two mechanisms are equivalent when achieving the same goal function.
Mechanism Design on the Change of Parameters Space
Let us consider the finite set for players ሼ1, ⋯ , i, ⋯ , Iሽ and the environment parameter space for the feasible outcome set . Players' types with respect to the feasible outcomes are represented by θ ∈ Θ. At the state , the player has sequence preference R ୧ (θ) in set . Let us assume that each player can observe the distribution of his/her own types and of other players' types, and thus, all players have complete information about their preference distribution in set . The players' preferences are not independent, and the social choice function is f: Θ →A. For each state , a non-empty choice set f(θ) ⊆A exists, which implies that the social choice function only depends on players' sequential preferences in set . Thus, the implementation problem becomes "Is there a mechanism so that in any state , the equilibrium outcomes set of is consistent with f(θ)?" In other words, the mechanism implements . In the general framework of mechanism design, the players' environment space is independent from the mechanism designer. This paper discusses the different requirements of mechanism implementation for equilibriums given that the mechanism designer can alter the players' parameter spaces. This paper chooses the Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. The VNM utility function of player is u ୧ (x, θ ୧ ) , let θ = (θ ୧ , θ ି୧ ) where θ ି୧ = (θ ଵ , ⋯ , θ ୧ିଵ , θ ୧ାଵ , ⋯ θ ୍ ) . The mechanism Γ = ൫S ଵ , ⋯ , S ୍ , g(•)൯ is a collection of strategy sets S ଵ , ⋯ , S ୍ and an outcome function g: S → X,S = S ଵ × ⋯ × S ୍ , in which each strategy set S ୧ contains a collection of feasible action plans of player . Let S = (S ୧ , S ି୧ ), where S ି୧ = (S ଵ , ⋯ , S ୧ିଵ , S ୧ାଵ , ⋯ S ୍ ).
exists in the mechanism so that for all θ ∈ Θ, g൫s * (θ)൯ = f(θ).
Mechanism for Change in Bi-variable Parameter Space. 1. Time sequence of mechanism design and implementation (1) The mechanism designer selects controlled variables, non-controlled variables, and the types of player parameter spaces. The designer then sets his/her goal function, social choice function, and information structure.
(2) Players choose equilibrium strategies according to the exogenous parameters space.
(3) Goal function can be implemented by the mechanism.
2. Discussion about necessary and sufficient conditions for mechanism duality The mechanism designer chooses two different mechanisms to implement the social choice function with respect to the same players. Under these two mechanisms, the designer selects different controlled variables so that these variables enter the parameter space to become exogenous parameters, and non-controlled variables correspondingly enter the strategy space to realize the utility maximization for the players.
Based on backward induction, the mechanisms will inevitably be dual equivalent when aiming to achieve the same goal, such as utility maximization; otherwise, the designer can obtain more utility by selecting non-dual mechanisms, which would change his/her goal function. Therefore, discussing the necessary and sufficient conditions is critical for the designer to select controlled variables, change the parameter space, and ultimately achieve the same goal function.
Sufficient conditions can be obtained based on the existence conditions of Nash equilibrium because the designer selects two different mechanisms. The same player chooses his equilibrium strategy under these two different mechanisms as if s/he plays the game under these mechanisms against himself/herself. Thus, an equilibrium strategy in a mechanism can be regarded as the optimal response to the equilibrium strategy of another mechanism. First, let us define the mapping r: ∑ ⇉ ∑,which is the Cartesian product of r ୧ . The reaction mapping r ୧ of player maps the strategy set in a mechanism to the strategy set that maximizes his/her utility in another mechanism. The fixed point of is that satisfies S ∈ r(S) . The same player under different mechanisms has S ୧ ∈ r ୧ (S), so the fixed point of is the Nash equilibrium. Proof: See Appendix. A necessary condition is that in any two mechanisms, the equilibrium condition of players has the same mapping form. In other words, the controlling variables and non-controlled variables of a mechanism designer share a consistent relationship under the equilibrium condition of players. Players in different mechanisms have different preferences due to different parameter spaces. Following the sufficient conditions, if players want to keep the relationship of controlled variables and of non-controlled variables unchanged under different preferences, players must react with the same best responses in different mechanisms. Therefore, multiple equilibriums exist.
The utility functions of players for mechanisms Γ ଡ଼ and Γ ଢ଼ are u ଡ଼ (p, S ଡ଼ (l)) and u ଢ଼ (S ଢ଼ (p), l), respectively. The variable space that the mechanism designer can choose from is ሼp, lሽ. S(l) is the strategy of players given that is the controlled variable, and S ଢ଼ (p) is the strategy of players given that is the controlled variable. When the mechanism designer aims to achieve the same goal, the following theorem provides the duality condition for two mechanisms:
Theorem 2 When the equilibrium strategy of players is continuously differentiable, the necessary condition for any two mechanisms to be dual equivalent is
Proof: See Appendix. General Mechanism for Change in Parameter Space. The mechanism designer chooses φ ୨ from a finite variable set Ω = ሼφ ଵ , ⋯ , φ ୫ ሽ, which represents the j‫ݐ‬ℎ variable where j = 1, ⋯ , m. The designer selects the controlled vector set Ω େ = ൛φ ଵ , ⋯ , φ ୨ ൟ and non-controlled vector set Ω େ = ൛φ ୨ାଵ , ⋯ , φ ୫ ൟ.
Theorem 3
The controlled vector set Ω େ and non-controlled vector set Ω େ enter the parameter space separately under the two mechanisms to be exogenous parameters. The necessary and sufficient conditions for these two mechanisms to be dual equivalent are (1) Sufficient condition: is the non-empty compact convex subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. For any S, r(S) is non-empty and convex; r(•) has a closed convex subset, given S ෨ ୬ ∈ r(S ୬ ), ൫S ୬ , S ෨ ୬ ൯ → (S, S ෨ ), then S ෨ ∈ r(S). .
Proof: See Appendix.
Land Auction Mechanism Design
Assumptions and Variables. When two potential property developers, and , participated in a single indivisible land auction, the auction takes the form of an FSLA.
Assumption 1 Distribution assumption
The truthful revelation of the property developer for the land is l ୧ . Given that the acquired land is ready for construction, the construction cost per unit land area is c ୧ . c ୧ belongs to the independent uniform distribution [c, c], and 0 < c < c. The distribution function is a continuous differentiable non-decreasing function, and is common knowledge.
Assumption 2 Private information assumption
The expected housing price per unit land area is p = l ୧ + c ୧ after the houses are ready for commercial use. The housing price represents the common expectations formed by all potential property developers. The truthful revelation of land value by the property developers depends on the expected housing price and construction cost. 
Proposition 1 If every property developer is ex ante identical, the property developer 's equilibrium bidding strategy satisfies
In In this mechanism, the government checks the housing price in the sealed-bid land auction and allows the property developer to provide the bidding. The essential difference between FSLA and LHPA is that in LHPA, the limited housing price changes the distribution function of the property developer's truthful revelation of land value.
Assumption 4 Limited housing price assumption Given that the government limits the housing price p ത = l ୧ + c ୧ , the property developer offers a sealed-bid b ୧ (l ୧ ).
Assumption 5 Profit function under limited housing price assumption The property developer 's benefit function is
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5, if every property developer is ex ante identical, the equilibrium bid price of the property developer satisfies In this mechanism, the government checks the land price in the sealed-bid land auction, the property developers offer a committed housing price, and the lowest bid wins the land. The essential difference between LLPA and FSLA is that in LLPA, the limited land price changes the distribution function of the property developer's truthful revelation of land value.
Assumption 6 Limited land price assumption Given that the government limits the land price l ̅ satisfies p ത = l ୧ + c ୧ , the truthful revelation for housing price and the committed housing price of the property developer are p ୧ and b ୧ (p ୧ ) , respectively.
Assumption 7 Profit function under limited land price assumption
The benefit function of the property developer is
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1, 6, and 7, if every property developer is ex ante identical, then the equilibrium bid strategy of the property developer satisfies Comparison between Mechanisms. FSLA is a market mechanism, whereas LHPA and LLPA are non-market mechanisms. We introduce the government's goal function and discuss the efficiency and duality of these mechanisms under the general optimality framework.The government, as the mechanism designer, sets its goal function as g(p, l),where p andl belong to the player parameter space.
Assumption 8 Government's goal function concavity assumption
The government's goal function g(p, l) is second-order continuous differentiable, and
< 0, which implies that when the housing price is low, curbing the housing price will lead to economic growth. However, when the housing price exceeds its optimal level, the consumers' benefits will be severely injured due to the exorbitant housing price, which in turn slashes the government's revenue.
The government designs a land auction mechanism, which is essentially an implementation issue based on the Bayesian equilibrium. The mechanism implementation process is as follows.
Step (1): The government chooses one of the three mechanisms while it either chooses or does not choose the limited variables;
Step (2): The property developers form different environment parameter spaces according to the restricted conditions from Step (1) and then provide their bidding price based on their own preferences;
Step (3): The auction is successfully carried out, the government goal is implemented, and the property developers obtain profits.
If FSLA is selected, the model becomes g(p, l) = C, where is a constant that is determined by the equilibrium strategy of the property developers.
If LHPA is selected, the model becomes A mechanism can be regarded as a system that governs the process rules of making collective choices, and the transformation of players' actions into social choices is determined by the outcome function. 
Summary
This paper discusses the mechanism duality problem when the parameter space is influenced by the mechanism designer's choices. The main contribution of this paper is to provide the sufficient and necessary condition for mechanism duality when the designer faces different mechanism choices. We apply this mechanism design method to the land auction process in China and obtain the following main conclusions:
(1) The necessary and sufficient condition for the mechanism duality to achieve the same goal function is the existence of an equilibrium condition for utility maximization of players, and its form remains unchanged under different mechanisms. Thus, the first-order condition of the controlled and non-controlled variables in different mechanism equilibrium functions is equivalent.
(2) When the revenue of the government is maximized, LHPA and LLPA are equivalent. (3) A comparison between non-market mechanisms (LHPA or LLPA) and a market mechanism (FSLA) indicates that the key is the trade-off between the government's interests and consumers' benefits. The government can only attempt to find a compromise between controlling land prices and collecting revenue from land finance.
(4) The truth-telling mechanism does not improve social welfare, but transfers a part of the profits made by the property developer to consumers, thereby shifting the tradeoff between revenue collected from land finance and consumers' benefits to the tradeoff among the government's revenue, the profits of property developers, and the consumers' benefits. This paper still has room for improvement. We did not discuss a scenario in which the parameter space changes, the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of and efficiency comparison between the existing mechanism, and the direct revelation mechanism that encourages players to tell the truth. Another discussion that could be explored further is the possible effect of changes in parameter space on the mechanism duality conditions when incomplete information exists between the mechanism designer and players.
Appendix
Theorem 1 proof: Refer to the proof of Kakutani fixed point theorem. Theorem 2 proof: It is similar to the multiplicity of equilibriums exist in the sufficient condition. Due to S ଡ଼ * (l) = t(p),l = t[S ଢ଼ * (p)], the first order conditions that the goal function set by the mechanism designer for two mechanisms are:
It is necessary to have
for two mechanisms being dual equivalent to achieve the same goal, if the goal function of the mechanism designer remains unchanged. Because the symmetric equilibrium bidding price of the property developer is b(l ୧ )=αl ୧ +β, we can obtain α= Thus the duality of LHPA and LLPA achieves the general optimality.
